Abstract: This paper focuses on the impact that two different types of policy interventions, namely enhancing school quality and contingent cash transfers , have on child labour and school attendance in Mexico. While there are many studies on the impact of Oportunidades on schooling outcomes, little evidence is available on whether school quality programs such as CONAFE also reduce child labour and help keep children in school.
Introduction
Education quality is attracting increasing attention in both developed and developing countries. The outcome of the PISA studies in particular have helped focus the attention of policymakers and researchers on what pupils are actually learning at school, thus making school quality the focus of an intense debate.
The issue of school quality is becoming increasingly relevant not only in high and middle income countries, but also in low income countries. As enrolment rates increase, developing countries are facing the challenge of supplying children and society at large with "quality" education. Low school quality is beginning to be seen as an obstacle to expanding school attendance, although little evidence is available to support such a link.
School quality is mainly measured in terms of students' achievements (using various indicators) and there now exists a substantive body of evidence showing that returns to education are significantly affected by the quality of the student and hence by the quality of education. As returns to education are also a proxy for labour productivity, the crucial role of education quality in the growth process is evident.
Much attention has been given in the literature to the analysis of the determinants of school quality, but we are far from achieving a generalized consensus.
For a recent review, the reader can refer to EFA report for 2005.
Much less attention has been paid to the role of school quality in determining household decisions about children's time use, i.e., decisions concerning school attendance and involvement in work. The allocation of children's time across different activities depends, among other things, on the relative returns of such activities. To the extent that school quality affects returns to education, it should also influence the household's decision concerning the investment in children's human capital.
An assessment of these effects will shed light on how important the provision of "quality" education is in order to promote school attendance and reduce child labour. It will also contribute to the broader debate on the relative merits of supplyand demand-side policies in achieving school enrolment and child labour reduction goals.
The widespread success of cash contingent transfer schemes (CCT) has shown the potential of demand-side policies for increasing human capital investment. In particular, these programs have been very effective in increasing school attendance, while the evidence of their efficacy on child work is not as consolidated. It is therefore of interest to see whether supply-side policies (quality-enhancing policies in our case) are effective alongside large demand-side programs, and how their efficacy compares.
A large number of studies have been devoted to the evaluation of Progresa/Oportunidades and we refer the interested reader to the available surveys.
Most of the studies have not compared Progresa/Oportunitades with other interventions, one notable exception being Coady and Parker (2002) , which focused on the comparison of demand and supply (school construction) policies.
Less is known about the effects of Oportunidades and CCT schemes in general on the supply of child labour. The available evidence on this link is reviewed in Dhushyanth (2006) . The review underscores the need for further research work in order to reach to reach any firm conclusions concerning the effectiveness of CCT schemes as a policy tool for combating child labour.
Similarly, while several published works look at the link between school quality and educational outcomes (for Mexico, see the recent paper by Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio, 2006) , much less is known about the links among school quality, school attendance and children's work. This paper aims to help fill these knowledge gaps by evaluating the impact of a specific school quality program, namely, the Compensatory Education Program (referred to hereafter as CONAFE for the sake of brevity), on school attendance and children's work. The paper also offers some initial comparison of the effects of CONAFE and Oportunidades.
The comparison of the effects of demand-and supply-side policies is particularly complex in the specific case of Oportunidades, and of CCT schemes in general, as such programs have multiple objectives and often represent a very important and large component of a country poverty reduction strategy. In this paper, we only aim to assess the impact of a quality-improving intervention, conditioning also on demand-side policies, to assess whether enhancing quality has an independent role in addressing children's work and schooling when implemented alongside CCT programs. We will also offer some initial evidence on the relative efficacy of the two programs.
In the next section we present the Oportunitades and CONAFE programs. We will then briefly review the results already available on the impact of these programs.
Our estimation strategies and the datasets used are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses the main results of the estimation.
CONAFE Compensatory Education Program and Oportunidades Cash Contingent Transfer scheme
Mexico is considered a middle-income country according to the World Bank indicators. However, the country is characterized by a strong inequality: 51% of the population live below the poverty line and 42% of total wealth belongs to the highest decile 1 .
The concentration of income has occurred despite large investment in health, education and other social sectors.. A number of programs have been put in place over the years to reduce and mitigate the effect of poverty. Among them, both conditional cash transfer programs and supply-side programs share the goal of enhancing the chances of the poor to move up the social ladder.
Supply-side programs are typically considered weak instruments for improving the access of poor families to social services. In other words, supply-side programs alone do not appear to be sufficient vehicles for "reaching" the poor and changing their circumstances by granting them better access to health and educational investments. Cash transfer programs (CCT), on the other hand, are regarded as bettersuited instruments for reaching the poor, as they provide regular benefits, typically in the form of cash, to poor households conditional on their satisfying certain behavioral conditions required for continued benefit eligibility.
Oportunidades has served as the blueprint of many of the subsequently implemented CCT programs. This program has channeled resources directly to the poor so as to promote their access to public available resources and infrastructure. The provision of cash transfers to eligible households is conditional on meeting several requirements: the child (below the age of 18) must attend school, must not repeat a grade more than twice, must attend regular medical check-ups, and the mother must attend health and nutrition training talks. In kind benefits are also provided to the households through the program.
It is worth noting, given the focus of our study on child labour, that the cash transfers provided through this program are tied to school and health outcomes of the child and not to the cessation of children working. 2 . The channel through which a school-promoting program intervention would reduce child labour is through the substitution away from child labour in favor of school (see Dhushyanth, 2006 A final program element is support to school management (Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar, AGEs). AGEs is based on the provision of grants to parents and leaders to be spent on the educational purpose of their choosing, though these grants are limited to small civil works and infrastructure improvements. AGEs also provides parents' associations with training to guide them on their spending (Capacitación para el Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar, CAPAGEs). This element has been proven to be particularly successful in affecting schooling outcomes. Gertler et al. (2006) show that a reduction in children's school failure and drop-out rate of 0.4 percentage points can be imputed to AGEs.
School management programs can be very cost-effective, as they can represent a low-cost way to improve school efficiency, by decentralizing decisions at school levels. Decentralization generates an output that is generally more efficient and tailored to the needs and characteristics of the local environment, thus inducing a more productive learning environment for the child. On the other hand, it is important that the incentive mechanism within a supply program is properly designed so as not to be exposed to the risks that decentralization may imply. These risks include the possible misallocation of public resources when the management of resources is controlled at a local level.
Existing evidence on the impact of supply side and cash transfer programs.
There is a large body of literature that illustrates the positive impact of CCT programs on education. In Mexico, among other countries, Schultz (2001) Little has been written on how the two types of programs compare in terms of their impact on school attendance. Coady and Parker (2002) examine whether the impact of demand side programs, such as Oportunidades, is diluted when distance to school is taken into account. They show that a reduction in school distance of 1 km increases secondary school attendance by about 7%. They also show that the impact of Oportunidades is stable after controlling for supply side program effects.
To our knowledge, there has been no attempt to study the possible impact of school quality on child labour. 5 Our research aims to help fill this gap by looking at the impact of a school quality program on the supply of child labour and school attendance. in addition, as CCT programs were also run in some of the communities sampled, we are able to compare the impact that the two different programs had on schooling and child labour outcomes.
Data sets and estimation strategy
To carry out our analysis we make extensive use of two datasets. The first contains the administrative data on CONAFE from 1997 to 2000 for primary schools.
This dataset includes very detailed information on the schools targeted by CONAFE For each wave, the dataset contains a questionnaire at the community level and at the household level. All waves contain detailed information on school attendance and labour market participation.
We combine the two datasets by selecting only those communities of PROGRESA dataset that also belong to the CONAFE dataset. 7 For the communities that belong to both datasets, we merge all the information on primary schools treated by CONAFE to the communities to which they belong. Communities with more than one school were dropped from our sample as we were not able to identify the different schools within the community. As a consequence, three per cent of the schools were dropped from the sample.
The reason why we consider only communities in the CONAFE sample is due to the challenge of finding an appropriate control group for our estimates. As The control group chosen is valid if the schools that are treated first do not differ from schools that will be treated in the future. Given the non-experimental nature of our data, if schools with the strongest (weakest) potential for improvement have been incorporated at earlier stages, our estimates would be overestimating (underestimating) the true program effect. Unbiased difference-in-difference estimates 6 We use ENCASEH data set as our baseline and not the first wave of ENCEL data as it does not contain information on labour force participation, our variable of interest. 7 The communities belonging to both samples represent the 80% of all communities.
rely upon the assumption that post-intervention trends between treated and nontreated schools would have been identical in the absence of the intervention.
As CONAFE is not a randomized experiment, worst performing schools were selected first as beneficiary schools according to a target index. The validity of our estimates, though, relies on the fact that communities in the control group and the We generate a sample consisting of 141,940 respondent-wave observations.
The selected sample includes children and adolescents 8 to 16 years old, for whom information on both attendance and work is available.
We assume that the outcome variables of interest, school attendance and participation in the labour market, are the result of a joint decision at the household level. We thus jointly estimate them by using a bivariate probit model. One of the reasons that would lead to a correlation between school attendance and work is that the unobserved learning ability of the child is likely to positively affect schooling and negatively affect children's work.
Our estimates will then identify the magnitude of the impact of program interventions both on school attendance and on children's work. However, measuring the impact of program interventions may become a difficult challenge if an appropriate control group is not identified. To this aim, we have exploited the gradual phasing-in of both interventions to estimate the difference-in-difference impact of the program. The gradual phasing-in of programs generates a sample of potentially treated schools or households that differs from the currently treated sample, allowing us to detect the difference-in-difference average treatment effect.
To identify the difference-in-difference estimate we follow the procedure used by Gertler et al. (2006) and Parker and Skoufias (2001) and we refer the reader to these papers for further details.
We estimate the following equation, where the subscripts i and t refer, respectively, to children and time:
, 1 1
The outcome of interest Y is a vector of two variables, (we avoid for simplicity the subscripts), both binary and equal to one if the child works or goes to school. We allow the error terms of the schooling and working equations to be correlated through the correlation coefficient ρ.
D is a set of temporal dummies aimed to capture the time trend. As the number of completed years of schooling is likely to be correlated with school attendance in the following year, we include a set of dummy variables for the number of grades completed in the X regressor set. These dummies should capture the differences in the propensity to attend school, due to the accumulated stock of education. We also include time-state dummies in our regression to capture macroshocks and policies different across states.
The other regressors in X include dummies on the maximum education level within the households (whether below primary or primary), a set of dummies for the age of the child, the number of teachers per grade in the community school, the number of children, adolescents and adults in the household, and a dummy for the child's gender and time-state dummy variables to capture macro trends common within states.
Results and Discussion
As mentioned in section 4, we estimate equation (1) using a bivariate probit model, on the assumption that the two error terms are jointly normally distributed.
Our dependent variables, jointly estimated, are the binary variables of working and school attending. The dummy for work takes the value of one if the child worked during the past week, while the school attendance dummy is equal to one if the child attended school during the past week. Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics relative to the sample used in the estimates.
In the age group considered, which also includes secondary school age children, 75% of the children attend school while only eight per cent perform some economic activity. It is noteworthy that most of the working children, especially of primary school age, also attend school. A large group of children, just below 80%, reside in communities that have benefited from CONAFE interventions, while about 70% of them belong to households that are potentially eligible to Oportunidades. participate in the labour market more intensively; 12% of them is working and not going to school, while only two per cent combine school with work. Just over a quarter (about 27%) of the children aged 12 to 16 is neither working nor studying.
As the sample used in the estimate is not representative at national level, we use the Mexican Family Life Survey to present nationally-representative estimates of the percentage of children in each activity for the year 2002 (Table 3) .
As the determinants of schooling might differ widely according to whether the child attends primary or secondary school (as also demonstrated by the previous evaluations of Oportunidades), we estimate two separate models for children, 8 to 11 years old, and 12 to 16 years old, respectively, These age groups correspond to the age range relevant for attendance to primary and secondary education. The estimated impact coefficients are shown in Table 4 and will be discussed below.
The results presented in Table 4 show that both Oportunidades and CONAFE have an impact on children's work and schooling, but that this effect is differentiated according to the age group considered. For young children (aged 8 to 11), CONAFE does not appear to have an impact on school attendance, while it reduces participation in economic activities. The supply side program has, however, an impact both on schooling (positive) and on work (negative) for the children aged 12 to 16.
Oportunidades has a positive impact on the school attendance of children at any age, and tends to reduce child labour, especially for the older children group. primary or secondary education, as late entry and grade repetition create a wedge between the age of the child and the actual grade she can attend. For this reason, we also estimate our model separately for children that have completed less than six grades (labeled Primary school age children) and for children that have completed six or more grades (Secondary school age children).
The estimation results based on grade completed are shown in Table 5 , column
(1) and (2). We can observe that the same pattern is maintained with respect to the estimation just discussed. However, in this case CONAFE appears to have an enhancing effect on school attendance for both age groups, while it maintains its negative impact on work. The effect of Oportunidades on schooling does not change, but becomes less defined in terms of children's work. The fact that the program effects are different according to whether we consider the actual age of children or their primary or secondary potential attendance, is likely to be due to the fact (well known for Oportunidades) that the largest effects of these programs are in terms of transition from primary to secondary education. We will return on this issue later on.
As the nature of our model is non-linear, the set of coefficients is not very meaningful, unless we provide the estimates of the corresponding marginal effects.
The marginal effects are calculated for the regression model where the sample of children is divided by their age range (8-11 and 12-16) and are presented in Tables 4   and Table 5 . Table 6 illustrates the program impact on the probability of school attendance.
Column (1) and (2) report the marginal effects of the programs on the young and older children, respectively. Oportunidades increases on average by two percentage points the attendance rate of the children aged 8 to 11, while CONAFE does not appear to have a significant impact. For the older children group (12-16), both programs significantly enhance school attendance. Belonging to a community treated by CONAFE increases the probability of attending school by almost two percentage points, while Oportunidades has a larger impact that has already been documented and needs not to be discussed here. The marginal effects calculated on the sample of primary and secondary school age children are reported in column (3) and (4) of Table 6 . In this case, CONAFE has an impact on the school attendance of children belonging to both groups. Belonging to a community that has received CONAFE in particular increases the probability of school attendance by just less than two percentage points. The effects of Oportunitades continues to be significant and larger than those of CONAFE, especially for the children of secondary school age.
Increasing school quality appears to be particularly effective in decreasing child labour supply. CONAFE significantly decreases child work, albeit by only 0.5 percentage points, for children aged 8-11, as shown in Table 7 (column (1)). The effect on children's work is larger for the age range 12-16 (column(2)), with CONAFE reducing the probability that a child works (with or without attending school) by just more than 1.5 percentage points. Only marginally higher results are obtained for primary and secondary school aged children (illustrated in Table 5 , column 3 and 4). Given the average participation rate in both age groups, the observed impact is far from negligible. The CCT program also appears to have a negative effect on child labour. The size of the effect is similar to that of CONAFE, but it can only be identified for some of the waves considered in this study.
The impact of both programs seems to be larger for the subgroup of older children for both age definitions used here. This is not surprising given that in Mexico primary school attendance is almost universal and that very few young children combine school and work. For these groups of children, we disentangle the impact the two programs on the child's probability of belonging to each of the four subcategories of children's activities mapped by the bivariate probit.
The results are presented in Table 8 and Table 9 , for the sample of children split by age and potential grade, respectively. The CONAFE program appears to have been effective in shifting children away from working (especially working only) to school, by increasing school as the sole activity by two percentage points. Conversely, the impact of Oportunidades on school attendance seems to have been generated mainly by reducing the probability of a child being "idle" (neither in school nor working) rather than by reducing child labour. Given the relatively small number of children in some of the categories, such results must however be considered with some caution.
Our analysis has focused on the impact of the two programs on child labour and school attendance, thus assessing the impact of the two programs on the flow of human capital accumulation. However, in order to assess whether CONAFE also affects the stock of investment in human capital and not only the attendance rate, we estimate its impact on the grades completed by children aged 8-16. We employed an ordered probit to estimate our model, as grade completion does not lend itself to the use of a linear metric. The explanatory variables and the approach used to identify the program effects are the same described above. The results of the estimates are presented in Table 8, while Table 9 contains the marginal effects.
We are particularly interested in the ability of the intervention to make a child complete primary school, as this obviously greatly increases the probability of continuing on in secondary education. For this reason, we present the marginal effects for the grades around primary school completion. As it is easy to see, improved school quality successfully increases primary school completion. The chances of completing the primary school are between one and two per cent higher for those children attending a school treated by CONAFE. The impact of Oportunidades is very similar in magnitude to that of CONAFE.
Conclusions
The results of the impact assessment presented in this paper clearly show that quality of education does not only matter for learning achievements, but it is also relevant for increasing school attendance. This result constitutes new evidence, as most studies has concentrated on the effect of school quality on learning achievements. This conclusion, it must be stressed, also holds when large demand side policies are in place. Supply side interventions, and those aimed at improving school quality in particular, appear then to be an important complement to demand side interventions. Improved school quality not only increases attendance, but also reduces involvement of children in work. Quality of education, hence, is important for increasing human capital investment by keeping children in school and away from work. In the case of Mexico, where the majority of working children also attend school, the observed impact implies that parents value quality of education: when they observe an improvement in the learning achievements of their children, they increase their involvement in education by reducing their participation to economic activities.
As most children attend primary school and do not begin to work at very young age, the larger effects on school attendance and, especially, on work for older children might also be an indication of a lock-in effect. Children that attend improved primary schools are more likely to continue in their studies and not to be working.
While the results obtained are suggestive of a relevant impact of supply side policies on child work and school attendance, we must bear in mind that they are relative to a middle income country like Mexico. Generalization of this conclusion would require additional work to be carried out also for low income countries.
As mentioned in the previous sections, it is difficult to compare the relative effectiveness of the two programs considered here given their different scope and size.
However, from the estimate it emerges that while supply side policies do have an impact on school attendance, demand side interventions like CCT appear to be more effective. The situation looks different in the case of children's work, where quality enhancing interventions are at least as effective as demand side policies in reducing children's involvement in economic activities.
Of course, more analysis is required in this area both in terms of assessing the relative cost efficiency of the different interventions and of more in depth testing of the results in terms relative impact of the policies. Regressors include time state dummy variables, treatment specific trends. Robust z statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% Regressors include time state dummy variables, treatment specific trends. Robust z statistics in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
